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PEOPLE v. HICKMAN
JOURNEY TO THE LOGICAL LIMITS OF
THE FELONY-MURDER DOCTRINE

The felony-murder doctrine defines a "homicide committed
while perpetrating or attempting a felony"' as murder. The
recent trend in felony-murder cases has been "to restrict very
narrowly the application of the felory-murder doctrine."'2 An
Illinois Supreme Court decision, People v. Hickman,3 is not only
a major impediment to the expansion of this trend, but an omen
of its termination. Unlike Commonwealth v. Redline,4 Hickman

applies the proximate cause theory of the felony-murder doctrine. Nevertheless, the results are the same, i.e., a felon can
be liable for the murder of an individual actually killed by a
person resisting the felony only if the person killed is not a
co-felon.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

At common law, malice aforethought was the element distinguishing murder from other homicides. 5 Such malice may be
express or implied., It is implied where the homicide occurs dur7
ing the commission of or during an attempt to commit a felony.
1. Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J.
537, 558 (1934).
2. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 722 (2d ed. 1969).

3. 59 Ill. 2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974), cert. denied, Hickman v. Illinois, 95 S. Ct. 1571 (1975).
4. 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
5. Coke described murder as the crime that takes place "when a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully killeth any reasonable
creature in being and under the king's peace with malice aforethought,
either express or implied." 3 E. COKE, INsTrruTEs OF THE LAWS OF ENGMalice aforethought is the criterion distinguishing murLAND 47 (1792).
der from other homicides. It does not mean spite or ill-will, but "the
dictate of a wicked, depraved and malignant heart." 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
A kiling of
COMMENTARIES 0198 (1897) [hereinafter cited BL. COMM.].
another may be justifiable, excusable, or felonious. The killing is justifiable if it is performed by a peace officer to enforce justice or as an execution. It is excusable if done accidentally or in self-defense. A homicide,
if felonious, can be murder or manslaughter. To be murder there must
be malice aforethought. Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice. Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537 (1934).
6. Express malice is killing deliberately and with a formed design.
4 BL. COMM. *199. Implied malice is not a different type of malice, but
a different way to demonstrate its existence. Perkins, A Re-examination
of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 547 (1934). Malice is implied
where the acts done are in wanton and wilful disregard of an unreasonable human risk. Mayes v. People, 106 Ill. 306, 46 Am. R. 698 (1883).
7. At common law, malice is also implied where the homicide resulted from resisting an officer of justice in the execution of his duty.
4 BL. COMM. *200-01. The oft cited reason for the felony-murder rule
is that at common law all felonies were capital offenses; it was of little
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The application of the doctrine is generally based on two8
theories, the agency theory and the theory of proximate cause.
The agency theory requires the act of killing be actually or constructively that of the accused, i.e., perpetrated by him or someone acting in concert with him and in furtherance of the felony.9
This theory, if applied alone, renders the felony-murder doctrine

inapplicable where the killing is actually performed by a person
resisting the felony. In such a situation, the proximate cause
theory is utilized to justify holding the felon guilty of murder. 10
The recent trend in case law is to criticize the use of the proximate cause theory." Instead of rejecting or criticizing the
proximate cause theory, however, Hickman utilizes it.
consequence whether the felon was hanged for the felony or the murder.
Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 413, 61 S.W. 735, 741 (1901). If
the unlawful act committed or attempted is a misdemeanor, at common
law the homicide is manslaughter.
And, in general, when an involuntary killing happens in consequence
of an unlawful act, it will be either murder or manslaughter, according to the nature of the act which occasioned it. If it be in prosecution of a felonious intent, or in its consequences naturally tended
to bloodshed, it will be murder; but if no more was intended than
a mere civil trespass, it will only amount to manslaughter.
4 BL. COMM. *192-93.
The felony-muder rule was criticized and changed in England.
Regina v. Serne, 16 Cox C.C. 311 (1877); Regina v. Whitmarsh, 62 Just.
It was finally
P. 711 (1898); Rex v. Lumley, 23 Cox C.C. 635 (1911).
abolished by statute. HoMICIDE ACT, 5 & 6 ELIZABETH 2, ch. 11 (1957).
The felony-murder doctrine in the United States is now commonly stated
as "homicide committed while perpetrating or attempting a felony is
murder." Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE
L.J. 537, 558. The doctrine is applied regardless of whether the killing
is unintentional or accidental. Id. at 557-58.
8. See Annot., 56 A.L.R.3d 239 (1974).
9. Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905).
10. People v. Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 194 N.E. 539 (1935) (the perpetration
of a felony sets in motion the chain of events causing death and therefore, the felon is criminally liable for murder).
11. The felony-murder doctrine has been severely criticized as being
a relic. Mueller, Criminal Law and Administration, 34 N.Y.L. REV. 83,
98 (1959). The courts have taken particular aim at the proximate cause
theory. The first cases in the United States criticizing the use of the
proximate cause theory in homicide law were manslaughter cases. People v. Garippo, 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920); Butler v. People, 125
Ill. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 7 Allen (89
Mass.) 541 (1863); State v. Oxendine, 187 N.C. 658, 122 S.E. 568 (1924).
Relying on manslaughter cases, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, in
a felony-murder case, said that, if proximate cause was a sound principle
on which to base felony-murder, even the dead robber would be guilty
of murdering the victim. Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W.
1085 (1905).
The most significant line of cases concerning the proximate cause
theory comes out of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970);
Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955); Commonwealth v.
Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949); Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357
Pa. 181, 53 A.2d 736 (1947). See also Wingersky, Death of Definition, 7
DeP. L.R. 172 (1957-1958). Redline, in overruling the Thomas decision,
holds that where a homicide is justifiable, i.e., the kiling of one of the
felons by a person resisting the felony, a co-felon cannot be liable for felony-murder. Redline distinguishes Almeida where a police officer is
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THE HICKMAN DECISION

Facts

In Hickman, the defendants were caught in the midst of a
burglary and attempted to flee to safety. One burglar was
immediately apprehended and was discovered to be in possession
of a handgun, while the other two suspects temporarily evaded
the police. However, one police officer noticed a crouching figure
with a handgun approach his position. The officer shouted an
killed by other police officers. This being only excusable homicide (accidental), the felon is still accountable for murder. Myers, rejecting this
factual distinction as being untenable, overrules Almeida. Both Redline
and Myers reject the proximate cause theory. These courts adopt only
the agency theory. Any killing by a person other than a felon, even
though resulting from resistance to the felony, is not attributable to the
felon as murder. In accord with the present Pennsylvania law are several jurisdictions: People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130,
44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965); Alvarez v. District Court In And For City And
County of Denver, 525 P.2d 1131 (Colo., 1974); State v. Garner, 238 La.
563, 115 So. 2d 855 (1959); Commonwealth v. Balliro, 349 Mass. 505,
209 N.E.2d 308 (1965); Sheriff, Clark County v. Hicks, 89 Nev. 78, 506
P.2d 766 (1973); People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d 48, 167 N.E.2d 736 (1960).
There are two recognized exceptions to the restrictions on the proximate cause theory. (1) Where the homicide victim is placed in a lifeendangering position by the felon, such as being used as a shield for
escape purposes or to facilitate the felony, the felon will be held accountable for the murder of the victim even if the actual killing is done by
a person resisting the felony. Wilson v. State, 188 Ark. 846, 68 S.W.2d
100 (1934); Miers v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 572, 251 S.W.2d 404 (1952);
Keaton v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. 621, 57 S.W. 1125 (1900); Taylor v. State,
(2) The Supreme Court of Cali41 Tex. Crim. 564, 55 S.W. 961 (1900).
fornia rejects the proximate cause theory. People v. Washington, 62 Cal.
2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965). However, where the felon
does an act in conscious disregard of human life, e.g., starts a gun battle
with police, he will be "vicariously liable" for the murder of anyone
killed by the persons resisting his acts because the response is reasonable
and not an independent intervening cause. Taylor v. Superior Court of
Alameda County, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 477 P.2d 131, 91 Cal. Rptr. 275 (1970);
People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1968);
People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442
A Nevada decision rejecting the proximate cause theory also
(1965).
rejects the California approach, concluding that the vicarious liability
theory is merely another way of stating the felony-murder doctrine.
Sheriff, Clark County v. Hicks, 89 Nev. 78, 506 P.2d 766, 768, n.7 (1973).
A result of the vicarious liability exception is that, if a co-felon is killed
in the melee, the surviving felon can be vicariously liable for murder.
See People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal. 2d 690, 408 P.2d 365, 47 Cal. Rptr. 909
(1968).
The Michigan courts have a line of cases in accord with the Redline
decision. In People v. Austin, 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d 766 (1963), the
Michigan Supreme Court uses the reasoning of Redline to hold that a
robber cannot be accountable under the felony-murder doctrine for the
justifiable killing of a co-felon. The court distinguishes People v. Podolski, 332 Mich. 508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952), in which a police officer is killed
in a gun battle with the felons. If the deceased is not a felon, but an
innocent person, and even though the actual killing is by a person resisting the felony, the felon is liable for murder if the killing occurred during
and arose out of the perpetration of the felony. Hickman, in distinguishing People v. Morris, 1 Ill. App. 3d 546, 274 N.E.2d 898 (1971), on the
basis of the status of the deceased, is in accord with the results, although
not the theory in Redline and Austin. People v. Hickman, 12 Ill. App.
3d 412, 417, 297 N.E.2d 582, 585-86 (1973).
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order to "drop it." That person failed to respond whereupon the
police officer fatally shot the individual, who was later discovered to be another police officer. No gunfire had been
exchanged between any of the burglars and police and, when
the felons were subsequently arrested, they were unarmed.
Nevertheless, the jury found those defendants who fled guilty
of murder. 12 The trial court entered an order arresting judgment of the murder convictions on the ground that in such circumstances the defendants could not be held liable under the
felony-murder doctrine. 13 The State of Illinois appealed.
Decision
The Illinois Appellate Court unanimously reversed the arrest
of judgment order of the trial court, and the Illinois Supreme
Court thereafter unanimously affirmed the judgment of the
Illinois Appellate Court. Hickman' 4 is controlled by ILLINOIS
REVISED STATUTES ch. 38, § 9-1 (a) (3), which states:
(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder if, in performing the acts Which
cause death:
(3) He is attempting or committing a forcible felony other
than voluntary manslaughter.")
ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES ch. 38, § 2-8 provides that burglary is
a forcible felony.1 6 The defendants contended that the death
was a result of a justifiable and lawful act by a police officer
and that, for the felony-murder doctrine to be applied under this
statute, the defendants or someone acting in concert with them
must have actually performed the fatal act.17
The court's rejection of this contention is based on statutory
construction. The opinion of the Illinois Supreme Court adopts
the statutory construction of People v. Allen 8 and commends
the reasoning of the Illinois Appellate Court which did not rely
12. The jury found Papes, the defendant who was in custody at the

time of the killing, guilty of burglary, but not guilty of murder.

liability is not in issue in either of the reviewing court decisions.

His

13. People v. Hickman, 59 Ill. 2d 89, 90, 319 N.E.2d 511, 512 (1974).
14. The use of "Hickman" or "Hickman decision" in the text refers
only to the Illinois Supreme Court decision. The Illinois Appellate Court
decision will be designated as such.
15. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 9-1(a) (3) (1971).
16. 'Forcible felony' means treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, robbery, burglary, arson, kidnapping, aggravated battery
and any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical
force or violence against any individual.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 2-8 (1971).
17. People v. Hickman, 59 Ill. 2d 89, 92, 319 N.E.2d 511, 512 (1974).

18. 56 Ill. 2d 536, 309 N.E.2d 544 (1974).
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on Allen. 19 In the Illinois Appellate Court decision of the Hickman case, Justice Scott states:
While the syntax of the words involved in our felonymurder statute could be interpreted on the restrictive and narrow lines urged by the defendants, we do not believe that in
statutory construction we are bound to consider only the wording used in the statute. The court in construing a statute may
consider the notes and reports of the commission pursuant to
which the statutory provision was adopted. (I.L.P. Statutes
ch. 6, sec. 126, p. 115, see 1952 Op. Atty. Gen. 159.) Turning
our attention to the committee comments in regard to the statute in question we find on page 9 of SMITH HURD ILL. ANN.
STAT., ch. 38, the following comments in regard to the applica-

tion of sec. 9-1 (a) (3), the felony-murder provision:
'It is immaterial whether the killing in such a case is intentional or accidental, or is committed by a confederate
without the connivance of the defendant. [sic] * * * or even
by a third person trying to prevent the commission of the
20
felony.'
The committee comments which annotate the felony-murder
statute cite People v. Payne2' as authority for this proposition of
law. Referring to Allen, the Illinois Supreme Court in Hickman
declares:
This court has recently re-examined the holding of Payne
and considered its import in relation to section 9-1 of the CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961, concluding that it was the intent of those
who drafted the felony-murder statute to incorporate therein
22
the holding in Payne.
Payne indicates that it is a natural and probable consequence
of an attempted robbery that a victim might be shot by a felon
or by someone resisting the robbery. Chief Justice Underwood,
writing for the Supreme Court in the Hickman decision, quotes
Payne:
'It might reasonably be anticipated that an attempted robbery
would meet with resistance, during which the victim might be
shot either by himself or someone else in attempting to prevent the robbery, and those attempting to perpetrate the rob23
bery would be guilty of murder.'
The Illinois Appellate Court opinion of Hickman adds that "a
defendant may be criminally responsible for the killing of
19. People v. Hickman, 59 Ill. 2d 89, 95, 319 N.E.2d 511, 514 (1974).
20. 12 Ill. App. 3d 412, 415, 297 N.E.2d 582, 584 (1973).
21. 359 Ill. 246, 194 N.E. 539 (1935).
22. People v. Hickman, 59 Ill. 2d 89, 93, 319 N.E.2d 511, 513 (1974).
23. Id.; People v. Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 255, 194 N.E. 539, 543 (1935).
See also People v. Krauser, 315 Ill. 485, 146 N.E. 593 (1925).
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another during the commission of a forcible felony even though
no certainty exists that the defendant or his cohorts performed
'24
the fatal act."
In addition to Payne, the Hickman decision relies on two very
recent Illinois Supreme Court decisions, People v. Allen 25 and
People v. Smith.26 In Allen a police officer was shot and killed
during an attempted armored truck robbery, the court holding
therein that a defendant could be convicted of felony-murder
whether the fatal shot is fired by a co-felon in furtherance of
the attempt or by a police officer in resistance thereto. According to the rationale of Smith, the felon need not foresee the precise sequence of events leading to the death. In Smith, the
Illinois Supreme Court stated:
It is unimportant that the defendant did not anticipate the precise sequence of events that followed upon his entry into the
apartment ....

His unlawful acts precipitated those events,

27
and he is responsible for the consequences.

The felons are not cleansed of criminal liability merely because
they were fleeing at the time of the fatal shooting. It has "previously [been] held that the period of time and activities ininvolved in escaping to a place of safety are part of the crime
itself. ' 28
The Illinois Appellate Court in Hickman quotes
People v. Golson 29 to explain that:
"*

*

[W]here two or more persons engage in conspiracy to

commit robbery and an officer is murdered while in immediate
pursuit of either or both of the offenders who are attempting
to escape from the scene of the crime with the fruits of the
robbery, each of the conspirators is guilty of murder, for the
crime had not been completed at the time inasmuch as the conspirators had not won their way to a place of safety. We pointed
out that a plan to commit a robbery would be futile if it did
not comprehend an escape with the proceeds of the crime, and
that unless the plan was to kill any person attempting to apprehend the conspirators at the time of or immediately upon
gaining possession of the property, the plan would be inane.'8 0
24.
(1973).
versed
N.E.2d
25.

People v. Hickman, 12 Ill. App. 3d 412, 416, 297 N.E.2d 582, 585
See also People v. Krauser, 315 Ill. 485, 146 N.E. 593 (1925) (reon other grounds); People v. Danner, 105 Ill. App. 2d 126, 245
106 (1969).
56 Ill. 2d 536, 309 N.E.2d 544 (1974).

26. 56 Ill. 2d 328, 307 N.E.2d 353 (1974).

(The accused entered the

deceased's apartment and threatened to kill her. Frightened, the victim
jumped to her death from a third story window.)
27. People v. Smith, 56 Ill. 2d 328, 333-34, 307 N.E.2d 353, 355-56
(1974).
28. People v. Hickman, 59 Ill.
2d 89, 94, 319 N.E.2d 511, 513 (1974)
(citing People v. Golson, 32 Ill.
2d 398, 207 N.E.2d 68 (1965)).
29. 35 Ill.
2d 398, 207 N.E.2d 68 (1965).
30. People v. Hickman, 12 Ill. App. 3d 412, 416, 297 N.E.2d 582, 585
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In addition, the Illinois Appellate Court distinguished People v.
Morriss ' from Hickman. Morris holds that a felon cannot be
convicted of felony-murder when a person resisting the felony
kills the felon's accomplice. In Hickman, the deceased is an innocent person, not the felon's accomplice. The basis of the
distinction is the status of the deceased. The deceased in Morris
is a co-felon who assisted in setting the causal chain in motion.
In Hickman, the Illinois Supreme Court makes no mention of
Morris.3 2 Chief Justice Underwood, stating the court's awareness of the felony-murder doctrine's restrictions in other jurisdictions, concludes, "[o]ur statutory and case law ...
dictate a
different, and we believe preferable, result."' 3
ANALYSIS

In analyzing Hickman, three conclusions are evident. (1)
The Illinois courts could have arrived at a contrary decision only
by reason of a strained application of the rules of statutory construction, for the legislative intent is clearly supportive of the
Hickman decision. (2) Hickman is consistent with Illinois case
law. (3) The same criticisms will be made against the Hickman
decision as have generally been made against the proximate cause
theory.
34
Statutory Construction

A statute affords the best means of its exposition and if the
intent of the General Assembly can be ascertained from its
(1973); accord, People v. Bongiorno, 358 Ill. 171, 173, 192 N.E.2d 856, 857
(1934).
31. 1 Ill. App. 3d 566, 274 N.E.2d 898 (1971).

32. This is capable of two interpretations. (1) The Illinois Supreme
Court acquiesces in the view of the Illinois Appellate Court, or (2) the
Illinois Supreme Court does not like the distinction and chooses to ignore it. The first seems the preferable interpretation since, had the Illi-

nois Supreme Court not agreed with the distinction, the opinion probably
would have included dictum to that effect.
33. People v. Hickman, 59 Ill. 2d 89, 95, 319 N.E.2d 511, 514 (1974).

34. Interpretation is generally spoken of as if its chief function was
to discover what the meaning of the Legislature really was. But

when a Legislature has had a real intention, one way or another,

on a point, it is not once in a hundred times that any doubt arises
as to what its intention was. If that were all that a judge had to
do with a statute, interpretation of statutes, instead of being one of

the most dificult of a judge's duties, would be extremely easy. The

fact is that the difficulties of so-called interpretation arise when the

Legislature has had no meaning at all; when the question which is
raised on the statute never occurred to it; when what the judges have
to do is, not to determine what the Legislature did mean on a point
which was present to its mind, but to guess what it would have intended on a point not present to its mind, if the point had been present ....
[W]hen the judges are professing to declare what the Leg-

islature meant, they are in truth, themselves legislating to fill up
casus omissi.
J.C. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SouRcES OF THE LAW 172-73 (1909).
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provisions that intent will prevail without resorting to other or
extrinsic aids for construction. 5
Extrinsic matters are referred to only where there is doubt as
to the statute's meaning.3 6 At first glance, the felony-murder
statute appears to be unambiguous. The person actually killing
the other must be one committing or attempting a felony. However, the statute provides that the one who "causes" the death
by perpetrating a forcible felony is guilty of murder.3 7 Under
the proximate cause theory, merely setting the causal chain in
motion is sufficient "cause." Therefore, the person perpetrating
the felony may be liable for murder even though he did not
actually kill anyone. To determine whether this interpretation
was the result intended by the legislature, the courts must resort
to rules of statutory construction.
Rules of construction are not rules of law3 8 and are used
only to ascertain legislative intent. 39 Not only should the statute
be construed in harmony with the existing law as "part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence," 40 but in case of
ambiguity, the statute should be construed by referring to the
common law in existence at the time of its passage. 41 The
present statute is merely a codification of the common law, with
the exception that specific felonies are designated as forcible
felonies.42
Hickman emphasizes that this conclusion is evi35. 34 I.L.P. Statutes § 125 (1958). See also Moran v. Katsinas, 16
Ill. 2d 169, 157 N.E.2d 38 (1959).
36. Burgeson v. Mullinix, 399 Ill. 470, 479, 78 N.E.2d 297, 302 (1948);
34 I.L.P. Statutes § 101 (1958).
37. The Court of Appeals of New York, in People v. Wood, 8 N.Y.2d
48, 50, 167 N.E.2d 736, 737 (1960), interprets the New York felony-murder statute as requiring that the felon perform the actual killing:
Section 1044 of the Penal Law, Consol. Laws, c. 40, defines murder
in the first degree as follows:
'The killing of a human being, unless it is excusable or justifiable,
is murder in the first degree, when committed:
'2. * * * without a design to effect death, by a person engaged
in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit, a felony either
upon or affecting the person killed or otherwise.'
(emphasis
added).
In Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876, 878 (Fla. 1955), the Florida statute
is interpreted to mean that the killing need not be done by the felon.
The court quotes F.S.A. § 782.04: "The unlawful killing of a human being
* * * when committed in perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate
any * * * robbery * * * shall be murder in the first degree."
38. 34 I.L.P. Statutes § 111 (1958).
39. People v. Hudson, 46 Ill. 2d 177, 181, 263 N.E.2d 473, 476 (1970);
34 I.L.P. Statutes § 111 (1958).
40. 34 I.L.P. Statutes § 130 (1958). See also Arnolt v. City of Highland Park, 52 Ill. 2d 27, 282 N.E.2d 144 (1972).
41. In re Estate of Frick, 26 Ill. App. 2d 56, 167 N.E.2d 266 (1960);
34 I.L.P. Statutes § 130 (1958).
42. Letter from Charles H. Bowman to the members of the Joint
Committee of the Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations to Revise
the Illinois Criminal Code, March 13, 1961. (Professor Bowman was the
chief architect of the ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961.)
Section 9-1 (a) (1) and (2) are a restatement of what is probably
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denced by the use of the common law, especially Payne, to support the explanation of the statutory law in the committee
comments. 43 Payne is based on the felony-murder statute which

was repealed when the

ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE OF

1961 was en-

acted. 44 The old statute is also considered merely "declaratory
' 45
of the common law.
Illinois Case Law
4

People v. Allen is the first Illinois Supreme Court case
to construe the Illinois felony-murder statute to include the
Payne holding. Payne concludes:
It reasonably might be anticipated that an attempted robbery
would meet with resistance, during which the victim might be
shot either by himself or someone else in attempting to prevent
the robbery, and those attempting to perpetrate the robbery
47
would be guilty of murder.
Payne continues, "[a] killing which happens in the prosecution
of an unlawful act which in its consequences naturally tends to
destroy the life of a human being is murder. ' 48 It is immaterial
whether the killing is unintentional or accidental. 49 People v.
Smith5" adds that the felon need not foresee the precise manner
in which death occurred. Payne and Allen can be factually distinguished from Hickman. In both, the death resulted from a
gun battle between felons and persons resisting the felony. 51
the current law, but (3) is a change since it restricts felony-murder
only.
(This probably does not involve a change since no case of
felony-murder has been found in Illinois where the felony was not
within the code classification of 'forcible felony.' Indeed one Illinois
case suggests, despite the present statutory language, the felony must
be forcible.)
The purpose of this letter was to apprise committee members of significant changes in the law which would result if the Code were adopted.
The above quotation was the only statement concerning section 9-1.
43. 59 Ill. 2d 89, 92-93, 319 N.E.2d 511, 512-13 (1974).
44. Involuntary manslaughter shall consist in the killing of a
human being without any intent to do so, in the commission of an
unlawful act, or a lawful act, which probably might produce such
a consequence, in an unlawful manner: Provided, always, that
where such involuntary killing shall happen in the commission of
an unlawful act, which in its consequences naturally tends to destroy
the life of a human being, or is committed in the prosecution of a
felonious intent, the offense shall be deemed and adjudged murder.
Act of January 6, 1827, ch. 38, sec. 28 [1826-27] Ill. Laws 128 (repealed
1961).
45. People v. Goldvarg, 346 Ill. 398, 401, 178 N.E. 892, 893 (1931).
46. 56 Ill. 2d 536, 309 N.E.2d 544 (1974).
47. People v. Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 255, 194 N.E. 539, 543 (1935) (citations omitted).
48. Id.
49. People v. Goldvarg, 346 Ill. 398, 402, 178 N.E. 892, 894 (1931);
People v. Danner, 105 Ill. App. 2d 126, 130, 245 N.E.2d 106, 108 (1969).
50. 56 Ill. 2d 328, 307 N.E.2d 353 (1974). See note 26 supra.
51. People v. Allen, 56 Ill. 2d 536, 309 N.E.2d 544 (1974) (gun battle
with police); People v. Payne, 359 Ill. 246, 194 N.E. 539 (1935) (gun battle with the robbery victims).
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In Hickman however, there was no gun battle, and the felons
were not proven to be armed. The felons may not even have
been in the immediate vicinity when the killing occurred.. 2
The Hickman decision points out that "[t]hose who commit
forcible felonies know they may encounter resistance, both to
their affirmative actions and to any subsequent escape. '53 The
Illinois Supreme Court prefers liability in such circumstances
rather than the California requirement that a gun battle be
initiated by the felons before they can be held accountable for
the murder of an innocent person who is killed by one resist54
ing the felony.
There are Illinois cases holding that the proximate cause
theory should not be applied as part of the law of homicide.
Butler v. People55 and People v. Garippo5 6 are both manslaughter cases. Both can be distinguished from Hickman. In
Butler the shooting of a third person by the sheriff was not
naturally to be expected to follow from the acts of the accused.57 The distinction is in the nature of the accused's act.
In Butler the act is assault, whereas in Hickman the act is
burglary. People do not expect to be fired at with a weapon
to prevent an assault. In Garippo,the causal connection between
robbery and the death is not established because there is no
direct evidence with reference to the shooting. 58 Further, the
deceased is one of the robbers. Since Morris, a felon cannot be
held liable for murder for the death of a co-felon who is actually
killed by a person resisting the felony, 59 and therefore, Garippo
would have the same result today without criticizing the proximate cause theory. Morris defines the outer limit of the proximate cause theory. The Illinois Appellate Court decision in
Hickman distinguished Morris, but the Illinois Supreme Court
failed to mention the case. Thus the Illinois Supreme Court
52. Whether the felon's flight is within the res gestae of the burglary

is not a contested issue in Hickman. Nevertheless, Hickman is consistent

on this point with prior Illinois cases and the majority of American case

law. People v. Golson, 32 Ill. 2d 398, 207 N.E.2d 68 (1965); People v.
Bongiorno, 358 Ill. 171, 192 N.E. 856 (1934); Conrad v. State, 75 Ohio

St. 52, 78 N.E. 957 (1906).

53. 59 Ill. 2d 89, 94, 319 N.E.2d 511, 513 (1974).

54. Id. at 95, 319 N.E.2d at 514.

55. 125 Ill. 641, 18 N.E. 338 (1888).
56. 292 Ill. 293, 127 N.E. 75 (1920).
57. See also Butler v. People, 125 Ill. 641, 646, 18 N.E. 338, 342 (1888).
("There was, therefore, nothing in the character of the assault which
could justify a prudent man resorting to a revolver."); People v. Krauser,
315 Ill. 485, 505-06, 146 N.E. 593, 601 (1925).
58. See Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 619-20, 68 A.2d 595,

607 (1949).

59. People v. Morris, 1 Ill. App. 3d 566, 274 N.E.2d 898 (1971).
(The
deceased co-felon was killed when he and one of the robbery victims
struggled for the co-felon's firearm.)
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appears to acquiesce in the Illinois Appellate Court distinction
based on the status of the deceased. 60
General Criticismsof the Proximate Cause Theory
In Commonwealth v. Redline,61 the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania made a similar distinction based on the status of
the deceased. Although overruling the proposition that the
felony-murder doctrine can be utilized to convict a felon for the
murder of a co-felon actually killed by a person resisting the
felony, 62 the Redline court refused to overrule the use of the
felony-murder doctrine in the situation where a police officer
is killed, even though inferences were raised by the defense that
the deceased was mistakenly shot by another policeman63
Despite this distinction, Redline rejects the proximate cause
theory, reasoning that the felony imputes malice, rather than the
act of killing.6 4 "[T]he killing must have been done by the
defendant or by an accomplice or confederate or by one acting
6 5
A more direct
in furtherance of the felonious undertaking."
causal chain is required between the death and the felony than
66
a mere coincidence.
In a subsequent case, Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v.
Myers,6 T the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania extends the
Redline reasoning to reject the use of the felony-murder doctrine where any person, innocent or co-felon, is killed by someone resisting the felony. "Indeed, to make the result hinge on
the character of the victim is, in many instances, to make it hinge
on the marksmanship of resisters."' 8 Myers, crticizing the felony-murder doctrine adds, "it has been said to be 'highly punitive and objectionable as imposing the consequences of murder
upon a death wholly unntended'."69 Myers also utilizes the
60. See note 52 supra.

61. 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).

("The defendant was convicted

of murder in the first degree . . .for the death of his co-felon from a

gunshot wound inflicted by a police officer endeavoring to apprehend
the two." Id. at 486, 137 A.2d at 473.)
62. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
63. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958), (up-

holding Commonwealth v. Almeida, 362 Pa. 596, 68 A.2d 595 (1949)).

64. See Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
See also Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for the Lethal Acts of Others,
105 U. PA. L. REV. 50, 59 (1956); Note, Commonwealth v. Redline, 71
HARv. L. Rsv. 1565 (1958).
65. Commonwealth v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 496, 137 A.2d 472, 476

(1958).
66. Id.
67. 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970). (A police officer was killed in
a gun battle with the felons. The defense raised inferences that the deceased was killed by another police officer.)
68. Id. at 234, 261 A.2d at 558.
69. Id. at 225, 261 A.2d at 553 (citing Pirsig, Proposed Revision of

the Minnesota Criminal Code, 47

MINN.

L. REv. 417, 427-28 (1963), in

which the major objection is the imposition of capital punishment).
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argument that the felony-murder rule is ineffective in prevent70
ing the commission of felonies.
Redline and Myers indicate that the basic objection to the
felony-murder doctrine's proximate cause theory is that a killing
in opposition to a felony is not in perpetration of it. The killing
must be actually or constructively the act of the felon, i.e., performed by the felon or one acting in furtherance of the felonious
intent. When the actual killing is performed by one resisting
the felony, there is a superseding cause 71 which is not foreseeable to the felon, and this foreseeability should be required for
72
criminal liability.
These criticisms can be rebutted, and support can be found
for the proximate cause theory. On the basis of common experience, several felonies have been designated as being inherently
dangerous.73 The purpose of the felony-murder statute is "to
prevent the death of innocent persons likely to occur during the
commission of certain inherently dangerous and particularly
grievous felonies. ' ' 74 ILLINOIS REVISED STATUTES ch. 38, § 2-8
lists these inherently dangerous felonies. 75 It is not necessary that the felon foresee the precise manner in which the
death occurs. It is only necessary that he foresee that human
life is endangered and that death may ensue in some way. 76 A
70. Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 226, 261 A.2d
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 58 (1949); accord, People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1965).
71. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr.
442 (1965). Superseding or intervening causation is described as follows:
If the act of the accused was in fact a cause of a socially-harmful
occurrence, and was a substantial factor thereof, it will be recognized
as the proximate cause 'unless another, not incident to it, but independent of it, is shown to have intervened between it and the result.'
R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 708 (2d ed. 1969). Chief Justice Traynor
in Washington, supra, points out that "[i]n every robbery there is a possibility that the victim will resist and kill. The robber has little control
over such a killing once the robbery is undertaken . . . ." 62 Cal. 2d
777, 781, 402 P.2d 130, 133, 44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 445 (1965). (Justice Traynor
also comments that the felony-murder doctrine could lead to absurd results such as holding one felon for the death of a co-felon actually killed
by a victim even though the felons were not armed. Generally, however,
one felon cannot be held liable under the felony-murder doctrine for the
death of a co-felon who was actually killed by a person resisting the
felony. If the crux of the argument is that the felons were not armed,
Justice Traynor does not appear to disapprove of the holding of an unarmed felon guilty of felony-murder where an innocent person is killed
by a co-felon, even if the accused was not aware that the co-felon was
in possession of a deadly weapon. The felon's weapon may be concealed.
It is not incumbent upon the victim or another resisting the felony to
politely inquire as to the felon's arsenal.)
72. Regina v. Serne, 16 Cox C.C. 311 (1877); O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 59 (1949).
73. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 40 (2d ed. 1969); Perkins, A Re-examinationof Malice Aforethought, 43 YALE L.J. 537, 560 (1934).
74. State v. Williams, 254 So. 2d 548, 550 (Fla. App. 1971).
75. See note 16 supra.
76. See People v. Smith, 56 Ill. 2d 328, 307 N.E.2d 353 (1974).

550, 554 (1970); O.W.
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person should reasonably foresee that when one of these inherently dangerous felonies is perpetrated or attempted human life
is endangered. Hickman observes: "Those who commit forcible
felonies know they may encounter resistance, both to their
affirmative actions and to any subsequent escape. ' 77 It is not
a superseding cause for a person attacked to defend himself or
his property. 78 Further, only the mens rea of the murder is
imputed to the felon. The actus reus is the setting in motion
of the causal chain by perpretating the felony. 79 The Illinois
Appellate Court's Hickman decision distinguishes Morris not on
the theory that the deceased is merely a felon, nor that he
assumes the risk, but because he assists in setting in motion the
chain of events which causes his own death. 0
Justice Burke of the Supreme Court of California, discussing
the deterrent effect of the felony-murder doctrine on the perpetration of felonies, points out:
[T]o say that the knowledge that this awesome, sobering, terrifying responsibility of one contemplating the use of a deadly
weapon in the perpetration of one of the listed offenses is not
the strongest possible deterrent to the commission of such offenses belies what is being demonstrated day after day in the
81

criminal departments of our trial courts.

In addition, the article which Myers cites to support the view
that the felony-murder doctrine is excessively punitive commends the Wisconsin statute which, instead of presenting the
felon-murderer with a death penalty, merely tacks an additional
77. 59 Ill. 2d 89, 94, 319 N.E.2d 511, 513 (1974).
78. "For any individual forcibly to defend himself or his family or
his property from criminal aggression is a primal human instinct." Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 241, 261 A.2d 550, 561

(1970)

(dissenting opinion); See also R.

PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw

719-

22 (2d ed. 1969); Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HARV.
L. REv. 633, 649 (1920).
79. It is equally consistent with reason and sound public policy to
hold that when a felon's attempt to commit robbery or burglary sets
in motion a chain of events which were or should have been within
his contemplation when the motion was initiated, he should be held
responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act.
Commonwealth v. Moyer, 357 Pa. 181, 191, 53 A.2d 736, 741 (1947).
If a person with legal malice commits an act or sets off a chain of
events from which, in the common experience of mankind, the death
of another is a natural or reasonably foreseeable result, that person
is guilty of murder, if death results from that act or from the events
which it naturally produced.
Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 520, 113 A.2d 464, 474-75 (1955)
(reversed on other grounds).
80. People v. Hickman, 12 Ill. App. 3d 412, 417, 297 N.E.2d 582, 58586 (1973).
81. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 791, 402 P.2d 130, 139, 44
Cal. Rptr. 442, 451 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
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fifteen years to the sentence for the felony.8 2 Since Furman
4
v. Georgia,83 the use of the death penalty is severely restricted.
The practical effect may well be that the felon-murderer only
gets a longer sentence of imprisonment. If so, the felony-murder rule might not be considered excessively punitive.
THE STATE OF THE LAW:

HICKMAN'S IMPACT

A felon is criminally liable for murder if he or his co-felon
kills another while perpetrating or attempting a felony. 85 It
is immaterial whether the killing is unintentional or acci-

dental.8
87

life

6

The felony must be either (1) dangerous to human

or (2) a non-violent felony which, under the circumstances,

must be carried out violently. 8 Where the killing is actually
performed by a felon or his co-felon, the felon can be held for
the murder of another co-felon.8 9 If the killing is done by one
resisting the felony, the felon cannot be liable for the death of
a co-felon.90

Those jurisdictions rejecting the proximate cause

theory of the felony-murder doctrine hold that even if the
deceased is an innocent person killed by one resisting the felony,
the felon cannot be held liable for murder.9 1 Had such a theory
been used in Hickman, the defendants could not have been found
guilty of felony-murder. These courts recognize exceptions
where the felons start a gun battle with the police 92 or use the
deceased as a shield in an escape attempt.9 3 No such incidents
occur in Hickman. Jurisdictions which retain the traditional
proximate cause theory continue to hold the felon liable for the
death of innocent persons accidently killed by forces resisting
82. Pirsig, Proposed Revision of the Minnesota Criminal Code, 47
L. REv. 417, 427-28 (1963).
83. 408 U.S. 238, reh. denied, 409 U.S. 902 (1972).
84. In Illinois a majority of a three judge court is required to impose
the death penalty. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8-1A (1973).
85. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr.
442 (1965); Commonwealth v. Moore, 121 Ky. 97, 88 S.W. 1085 (1905);
Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d 550 (1970).
86. People v. Smith, 56 Ill. 2d 328, 307 N.E.2d 353 (1974); People v.
Goldvarg, 346 Ill. 398, 178 N.E. 892 (1931); People v. Danner, 105 Ill.
App. 2d 126, 245 N.E.2d 106 (1969).
87. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 9-1(a) (3), 2-8 (1973); People v. Pavlic,
227 Mich. 562, 199 N.W. 373 (1924).
88. People v. Auilar, 59 Ill. 2d 95, 319 N.E.2d 514 (1974).
89. People v. Warren, 44 Mich. App. 567, 205 N.W.2d 599 (1973) (liability is not based on felony-murder).
90. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr.
442 (1965); People v. Morris, 1 Ill. App. 3d 566, 274 N.E.2d 898 (1971);
People v. Austin, 370 Mich. 12, 120 N.W.2d 766 (1963); Commonwealth
v. Redline, 391 Pa. 486, 137 A.2d 472 (1958).
91. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr.
442 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 261 A.2d
550 (1970).
92. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr.
442 (1965).
93. Miers v. State, 157 Tex. Crim. 572, 251 S.W.2d 404 (1952).
MINN.
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the felony. 94 The felon is liable for homicides resulting from
any resistance which is natural, probable, and foreseeable, except
the death of a co-felon. 95 Resistance is foreseeable, 9 although
it is not necessary that the felon foresee the actual manner in
which the death occurred, only that death may occur. 97 The
felon is liable even though the killing occurs while he is attempting to escape to a place of safety.9 8 It is only because the proximate cause theory is utilized that the defendants in Hickman
are held criminally liable for felony-murder.
Hickman provides continuity between the common law and
modern law. The Hickman decision will probably result in the
gradual withdrawal by the American courts from the extreme
positions of Myers and People v. Washington,9 9 and thereby
bring certainty to the law. The felon in Illinois will be responsible for the death of any person, except a co-felon, killed by
another resisting the felony. Judges and lawyers will find the
law more certain in application than it has been in the years
since Redline, and perhaps equally important, the Hickman decision evidences the response of the legal system to society's
demand that the rights of the victim be considered along with
the rights of the accused. 100 The victim, i.e., the community,
94. See People v. Hickman, 59 Ill. 2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974); Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1955); People v. Podolski, 332 Mich.
508, 52 N.W.2d 201 (1952).
95. People v. Hickman, 59 Ill. 2d 89, 319 N.E.2d 511 (1974).
96. Id. at 94, 319 N.E.2d at 513.
97. People v. Smith, 56 Ill. 2d 328, 307 N.E.2d 353 (1974).
98. People v. Hickman, 59 Ill. 2d 89, 94, 319 N.E.2d 511, 513 (1974).
99. People v. Washington, 62 Cal. 2d 777, 402 P.2d 130, 44 Cal. Rptr.
442 (1965) (holding that, for a felon to be liable under the felony-murder doctrine, the killing of an innocent person must be done by the felon
or a co-felon).
100. The Illinois Appellate Court's Hickman opinion quotes Justice
Cardozo:
'When they [Judges] are called upon to say how far existing rules
are to be extended or restricted, they must let the welfare of society
fix the path, its direction and its distance, *
The final cause
of law is the welfare of society.'
12 Ill. App. 3d 412, 417, 297 N.E.2d 582, 586 (1973); B. CARDozo, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66-67 (1932).
Courts have a duty, especially in these days when crime has become so prevalent, to see that the lives, the property and the rights
of law-abiding people are protected and consequently must delicately balance the scales of justice so that the rights of the public
are protected equally with those of the persons accused of crime.
Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa. 500, 519, 113 A.2d 464, 474 (1955) (reversed on other grounds). The rise in crime has been attributed to the
recent "pro-criminal decisions."
This is the age of Crime and Criminals, and the peace-loving citizen
is the forgotten man. Murder, robbery and rape are rampant, and
this tidal wave of ruthless crime, violence and widespread lawlessness which too often goes unpunished is due in considerable part
to recent pro-criminal decisions of the highest courts in our State
and Country.
Commonwealth ex rel. Smith v. Myers, 438 Pa. 218, 238, 261 A.2d 550,
560 (1970) (dissenting opinion). This rise in crime has been docu-
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must have redress for the fatal results of the felon's gross indifference to the inalienable right to life of all persons in the community. The future of the felony-murder doctrine includes the
utilization of the proximate cause theory; consequently, the
Hickman decision will lead to an increase in felony-murder convictions. The protection of society requires it.
Hickman signals the revitalization of the proximate cause
theory of the felony-murder doctrine. It indicates that the result
in Redline could have been attained without rejecting the proximate cause theory. The extension of Redline has defeated much
of the purpose behind the felony-murder doctrine, even though
its rationale remains logically sound. The Illinois Supreme Court
refuses to reject this traditional reasoning. As a result, a consistent, and uniform system of jurisprudence is presented, and
an example is set for other jurisdictions which also consider it
preferable to maintain, rather than ignore, the centuries of
reasoning behind the felony-murder doctrine.
Gale Murrin
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